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WHAT THE HELLER?:
AN ORIGINALIST CRITIQUE OF JUSTICE SCALIA'S
SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Enrique Schaerer*
In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Scalia construed the Second
Amendment based on sound textualist principles, as guaranteeing an
individual right to keep and bear arms. But to the extent he defined the
scope of this right indeterminately, he failed to abide by his originalist
principles. This Article argues that the Second Amendment should
protect, as a threshold, weapons that can be fairly traced back to
weapons in common use at the time of the Framing, rather than, as
Justice Scalia suggested, weapons in common use at some everchanging "present" time. To subject the Second Amendment right to a
present-daypopularity contest, as Justice Scalia appears to do, is to put
this right on ground that is forever uncertain, unstable, and ultimately
nonoriginalist.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Antonin Scalia is a textualist. In his own words, he "look[s]
for meaning in the governing text, ascribe[s] to that text the meaning
that it has borne from its inception, and reject[s] judicial speculation
about both the drafters' extratextually derived purposes and the
His
desirability of the fair reading's anticipated consequences."'
interpretive philosophy includes not only general principles of
textualism, such as the supremacy-of-text principle, 2 but also specific
canons associated with originalism, such as the fixed-meaning canon. 3
Justice Scalia explains: "Textualism, in its Turest form, begins and ends
with what the text says and fairly implies.' Originalism, as part of this
process, gives effect to the original meaning of the text, rather than a
new meaning that may shift unpredictably, even radically, over time.
Textualism is Justice Scalia's preferred interpretive philosophy
because, in a democracy, "[i]t is the law that governs, not the intent of
the lawgiver"66-much less the policy preference of a particular judge or
panel of judges.7 For Justice Scalia, textualism is far from perfect,' but
1. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL

TEXTS xxvii (2012); see also id. at 16 ("Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they
enact which binds us.").
2. Id. at 56-58 (discussing the supremacy-of-text principle, i.e., that the meaning of a law
depends on its text).
3. Id. at 78-92 (explaining the fixed-meaning canon, i.e., that a legal text means what it was
understood to mean at the time it was enacted).
4. Id. at 16. "Textualism should not be confused with so-called strict constructionism .... A
text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed
reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means." Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).

5. To understand just how radical the shift may be, consider an example. In the 18th century
the words "awful, artificial, and amusing" meant "awe-inspiring, highly artistic, and thoughtprovoking," respectively, whereas in the 21st century the three words have a very different, mostly
negative connotation. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 78. Thus, to apply contemporary meaning to
those words, as they were used centuries ago, would be to misapprehend their meaning entirely. Id.
6. Scalia, supra note 4, at 17.
7. Id. at 22 ("It is simply not compatible with democratic theory that laws mean whatever they
ought to mean, and that unelected judges decide what that is."); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 83
("This corrosion of democracy occurs even when law-revising judges are elected, as they are in many
states. The five or seven or nine members of a state supreme court, lawyers all, can hardly be
considered a representative assembly.").
8. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at xxix ("Textualism will not relieve judges of all doubts
and misgivings about their interpretations. Judging is inherently difficult, and language notoriously
slippery."). Textualism, of course, has its detractors. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 348 (1990) (raising
several objections to textualism); David H. Souter, Text of Justice David Souter 's Speech, HARV'ARD
GAZETTE (May 27, 2010), available at http://news.harvard.edulgazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justicedavid-souters-speech/ (criticizing the "fair reading model" of interpretation); see also SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 1, at 18-28 (surveying purposivism, consequentialism, and other nontextualist
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it is nonetheless the best way to preserve democracy and uphold the
worthwhile American ideal to have a "government of laws, not of
men."9 And originalism, properly understood, is a vital ingredient in
this democratic recipe: "When government-adopted texts are given a
new meaning, the law is changed; and changing written law, like
adopting written law in the first place, is the function of the [legislative
and, less so, executive] branches of government. . . ," not the judicial
branch.' 0
Of course, that the meaning of enacted law remains constant does not
mean that originalism cannot account for new phenomena. "Drafters of
every era know that technological advances will proceed apace and that
the rules they create will one day apply to all sorts of circumstances that
they could not possibly envision ... .1."1 So courts do not hesitate to
apply the law to novel situations over time. An originalist judge merely
asks how a new phenomenon or technology fits within the original
meaning of the law.' 2 Sometimes "there will be disagreement regarding
the original meaning" or "as to how that original meaning applies to new
and unforeseen phenomena," but "the originalist at least knows what he
is looking for: the original meaning of the text."' 3 With the
Constitution, this search for original meaning entails a careful historical
inquiry, in which an originalist will often consult the writings of
"intelligent and informed people of the time" when relevant
constitutional provisions were adopted, as those writings "display how
the text of the Constitution was originally understood."' 4 This, in broad
strokes, is how originalism fits within the broader framework of
textualism.
Textualism has definite implications for Justice Scalia's interpretation
of the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment provides: "A well
approaches to constitutional and statutory construction). These critiques of textualism, as well as the
ongoing debate over the merits of textualism, are beyond the scope of this Article.
9. Scalia, supranote 4, at 17; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Forewordto SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 1, at xxi, xxvi n.10 ("Although the origin of this phrase is lost to time, it states a goal
common to this nation's founding generation and those alive today.").
10. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 82-83; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (enacting a statute
requires bicameral approval by Congress and, in most cases, signature by the President); U.S. CONST.
art. V (amending the Constitution usually requires a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress and
ratification by three fifths of the state legislatures).
11. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 86.
12. Id. ("The meaning of rules is constant. Only their application to new situations presents a
novelty."). Justice Scalia endorses a version of originalism that, true to textualism, looks to "original
meaning, as opposed to originalintention. . . ." Id. at 92.
13. Scalia, supranote 4, at 45.
14. Id. at 38. For this reason, Justice Scalia "will consult the writings of some men who
happened to be delegates to the Constitutional Convention-Hamilton's and Madison's writings in The
Federalist, for example"-but will "give equal weight to Jay's pieces in The Federalist, and to
Jefferson's writings, even though neither of them was a Framer." Id.
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regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 5 Even
before the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the Second
Amendment, Justice Scalia hinted in a published essay that he read the
Second Amendment to secure an individual right to have arms for selfdefense:
[W]e value the right to bear arms less than did the Founders
(who thought the right of self-defense to be absolutely
fundamental), and there will be few tears shed if and when
the Second Amendment is held to guarantee nothing more
than the state National Guard. But this shows that the
Founders were right when they feared that some (in their
view misguided) future generation might wish to abandon
liberties that they considered essential, and so sought to
protect those liberties in a Bill of Rights.' 6
More than a decade later, when the Supreme Court finally weighed in on
the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller,17 Justice
Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.' 8 And, not surprisingly, he
adopted a textualist reading. His majority opinion in Heller carefully
parsed the language of the Second Amendment as guaranteeing an
individual right to keep and bear arms-"the right of the people"rather than a collective right conditioned on eligibility for or service in a
state militia.19 In a clear nod to originalism, he also adopted a historical
approach, 20 recognizing that the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms, much like the First Amendment right to free speech, 1 has
15. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
16. Scalia, supra note 4, at 43.

17. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
18. Id. at 573-636. Justice John Paul Stevens, in dissent, articulated the view that Justice Scalia
had long feared the Court would adopt: that the Second Amendment protects nothing more than
organized state militia activities. Id. at 636-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent, Justice
Stephen Breyer argued that, even if the Second Amendment secured a personal right to handguns for
self-defense in the home, the challenged laws could be upheld under an interest-balancing test. Id. at
681-723 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 579-95.
20. Id. at 605-26. Originalists, when interpreting the Constitution, look for original meaning at
(or around) the time a relevant constitutional provision was adopted-that is, when it was enacted by
Congress and ratified by the states. See, e.g., Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century Understandingof
the EstablishmentClause, 6 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 399, 429 (2002) (endorsing "a search for the original
meaning of the text as enacted and ratified"); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of
the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1127, 1136 (1998) (declaring that originalism "is the idea that the
words of the Constitution must be understood as they were understood by the ratifying public at the time
of enactment"); cf Heller, 554 U.S. at 605 (offering as another tool for constitutional interpretation the
examination of various "legal and other sources to determine the public understanding of a legal text in
the period after its enactment or ratification" (emphasis omitted)).
21. In Heller, Justice Scalia drew several parallels between the First and Second Amendments.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (noting that "the Second Amendment. . . right [to keep and bear arms] was not
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never been treated as absolute and has long been subject to important
limitations.22
One such limitation, noted Justice Scalia, is on the types of weapons
that are protected under the Second Amendment.2 3 For this, he relied
primarily on the Court's 1939 decision in United States v. Miller,24
which, among other things, rejected a Second Amendment challenge to
an indictment charging two men with violating federal restrictions on
the possession of short-barreled shotguns.2 5 According to Justice Scalia,
Miller's holding that "the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in
common use at the time"' 26 finds support in "the historical tradition of
prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons.', 27 He
thus affirmed that, per Miller, "the Second Amendment does not protect
those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns." 28
With this background, Justice Scalia turned to the Second
Amendment challenge at issue in Heller, in which a special police
officer sought to enjoin enforcement of a handgun ban and trigger-lock
requirement in the District of Columbia. 29 Justice Scalia, writing for the
Heller majority, held that "the District's ban on handgun possession in
the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition
against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the
purpose of immediate self-defense." 30 Declining to establish a test for
the constitutionality of gun laws, he reasoned that such "severe"
restrictions ran afoul of the Second Amendment under any standard of

unlimited, just as the First Amendment's right of free speech was not"); id ("[W]e do not read the
Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we
do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose."); see also id
at 582 ("Just as the First Amendment protects modem forms of communications,. . . the Second
Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were
not in existence at the time of the founding." (citations omitted)).
22. Id. at 626-28.
23. Id. at 627-28. Justice Scalia noted another limitation, explaining that "nothing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms." Id at 626-27.
24. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
25. Id. at 178-83.
26. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).
27. Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*148-49 (1769)

[hereinafter

BLACKSTONE], and citing 19th-century treatises, cases, and other sources).
28. Id. at 625.
29. Id. at 574. At oral argument, Heller withdrew a request to enjoin the enforcement of a
separate licensing requirement. Id. at 630-31.
30. Id at 635.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

5

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 3

800

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

constitutional scrutiny.3 ' Notably, he relied in part on the inquiry in
Miller-whether a weapon is "in common use at the time"-to arrive at
the holding in Heller: "Whatever the reason, handguns are the most
popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and
a complete prohibition of their use is invalid." 32
This suggests that the relevant time in the common-use inquiry, as
articulated in Miller and adopted by Heller (i.e., whether a weapon is "in
common use at the time"), is the present time-rather than the time the
Second Amendment (for federal gun laws) or the Fourteenth
Amendment (for state and local gun laws) was adopted. 3 In other
words, Justice Scalia's discussion in Heller strongly implies that, to
determine whether a particular weapon merits Second Amendment
protection in the first place, a court must ask whether that weapon is in
common use for self-defense at the time the court is considering the
issue, rather than whether it was in common use for self-defense (or is
similar to what was in common use for self-defense) at the time the
Second and Fourteenth Amendments were adopted in 1791 and 1868,
respectively. 34 Several courts have interpreted Heller to establish this
present-time inquiry of what weapons are in common use for lawful
As have some commentators.36 Even Justice Stephen
purposes.
31. Id. at 628-29.
32. Id. at 629; see also id. at 628 ("The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class
of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [self-defense].").
33. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038-42 (2010) (plurality opinion)
(incorporating the Second Amendment against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause). Justice Thomas, in a concurrence, argued that such incorporation should be through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id. at 3084-88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
34. See id. at 3038-42; Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 710 (7th Cir. 2011) ("McDonald
confirms that when state-or local-government action is challenged, the focus of the original-meaning
inquiry is carried forward in time; the Second Amendment's scope as a limitation on the States depends
on how the right was understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.").
35. See, e.g., Heller v. Dist. of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
("[B]ased on the record as it stands, we cannot be certain whether these weapons are commonly used or
are useful specifically for self-defense or hunting and therefore whether the prohibition of certain semiautomatic rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds meaningfully affect the right to keep and
bear arms."); United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Unlike the handguns in
Heller, pipe bombs are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."); United
States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Machine guns are not in common use by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of dangerous and unusual
weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use."). But see, e.g., United States v. Pruess,
703 F.3d 242, 246 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) (reading Heller to state "that 'the sorts of weapons' the
Amendment protects are 'those in common use at the time' of ratification" (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at
627)).
36. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 712 (2012) ("If a weapon was widely used and originally
understood to be within the scope of the right to keep and bear arms, why should it lose its constitutional
protection merely because the number of its users dwindles over the years? In addition, Scalia's
approach gives governments an incentive to ban new types of weapons as soon as they appear, so that
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Breyer's dissent in Heller understood Justice Scalia's discussion in this
way.
This Article has two main parts. The first part argues that Justice
Scalia persuasively interpreted the Second Amendment, based on sound
textualist principles, to secure an individualright to keep and bear arms.
The second part argues that Justice Scalia defined the limited scope of
this right in too indeterminate a manner to square with his originalist
principles. The Second Amendment should protect weapons that can be
fairly traced back to those weapons in common use at the time relevant
constitutional amendments were adopted-that is, the Second
Amendment should protect the "lineal descendants" of commonly used
Framing-era weapons-rather than, as Justice Scalia suggested,
weapons in common use at some ever-changing "present" time. To
subject the right to keep and bear arms to a present-day popularity
contest, as Justice Scalia appears to do, is to put this right on ground that
is forever uncertain, unstable, and ultimately nonoriginalist.
II. THE INDIVIDUAL NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS

In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Scalia interpreted the
Second Amendment to guarantee an individual right to keep and bear
arms (i.e., a right that could be "exercised individually" for self-defense
purposes), rather than a collective right (i.e., a right that could be
"exercised only through participation in some corporate body," such as a
state-organized militia for military purposes).39 True to his interpretive
philosophy, Justice Scalia began his majority opinion with a persuasive
textual analysis that carefully parsed the language of the Second
Amendment.
The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 40 As Justice Scalia observed in
Heller, this constitutional provision is "naturally divided" into two parts:
they never become common enough to receive constitutional protection.").
37. Heller, 554 U.S. at 720-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The majority says that that Amendment
protects those weapons typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.... On the
majority's reasoning, if tomorrow someone invents a particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense
weapon, Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for once it becomes popular Congress
will no longer possess the constitutional authority to do so. In essence, the majority determines what
regulations are permissible by looking to see what existing regulations permit. There is no basis for
believing that the Framers intended such circular reasoning." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
38. Id. at 581; id. at 592 (holding that the words in the Second Amendment "guarantee the
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation").
39. Id. at 579. Justice Stevens, in dissent, took the view that the Second Amendment secures
only a collective right to have arms for militia participation. Id. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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a prefatory clause ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State") and an operative clause ("the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"). 4 1 He explained
that the prefatory clause merely announces a nonexclusive reason for
securing the right set forth in the operative clause 42: to prevent
elimination of the militia.4 3 Although this stated purpose in the
prefatory clause could resolve any ambiguity that may (or may not) exist
in the operative clause, he noted that the "prefatory clause does not limit
or expand the scope of the operative clause" grammatically." This
comports with the well-established principle, which he and others have
recognized, that "an expression of specific purpose in the prologue will
not limit a more general disposition that the operative text contains.'
This makes sense given that "legislative remedies often go beyond the
specific ill that prompted the [law]."46
In Heller, Justice Scalia thus gave effect to the Second Amendment's
operative clause as an operative clause and the prefatory clause as a
prefatory clause (that provided a reason for, but did not otherwise limit,
the right secured in the operative clause).4 7 As a prefatory clause is only
relevant to resolve any ambiguity in the operative clause, Justice Scalia
looked to the operative clause first. 48 He reasoned that it unambiguously
secured an individual right held by all law-abiding, responsible
Americans to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes (not just militia
members for military purposes). 49 Thus, according to Justice Scalia,
41. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577. Justice Stevens's dissent also acknowledges this grammatical
division in the Second Amendment between a prefatory clause and an operative clause. Id. at 640-44
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 577.
43. Id at 599.
44. Id. at 577-78.
45. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 219; cf 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SAMBIA SINGER,
STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.4, at 292 (7th ed. 2007) (noting that, in the related field
of statutory interpretation, "the preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where
the enacting part is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms"). On an originalist note, Justice Scalia
pointed out in Heller that when the Second Amendment was adopted in 1791, the rule in both America
and England was that "the preamble could not be used to restrict the effect of the words used in the
purview." Heller, 554 U.S. at 578 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 219.
47. Heller, 554 U.S. at 598-600; see id. at 578 n.3. In so doing, Justice Scalia persuasively
dispensed with Justice Stevens's criticism that his treatment of the prefatory clause violated the canon
against surplusage. Id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the general rule that every clause in a
statute must have effect).
48. Id. at 578 n.4 ("[I]f a prologue can be used only to clarify an ambiguous operative provision,
surely the first step must be to determine whether the operative provision is ambiguous.").
49. Id. at 595 ("There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms."); see also id. at 581 ("[T]he Second
Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans."); id. at 625 ("[T]he Second
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
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there simply was no ambiguity in the operative clause for the prefatory
clause to resolve. But, in Heller, he nevertheless interpreted both the
operative clause and the prefatory clause, and then explained how the
two clauses fit together-all according to sound principles of textualism,
as discussed below.
A. The Operative Clause of the SecondAmendment
Justice Scalia first discussed what, for a textualist, is the "most salient
feature" of the Second Amendment's operative clause: that it codifies a
"right of the people." 50 This is strong textual evidence that the Second
Amendment guarantees not a collective right, but an individual right.
This is so because, as Justice Scalia correctly noted, "[n]owhere else in
the Constitution does a 'right' attributed to 'the people' refer to anything
other than an individual right." 52 The phrase "right of the people" in the
First Amendment's Assembly-and-Petition Clause and the Fourth
Amendment's Search-and-Seizure Clause, along with similar
terminology in the Ninth Amendment, refer to individual rights.53
Justice Scalia carefully distinguished these analogous constitutional
provisions from nonanalogous provisions that may refer to "the people"
acting collectively-but only with respect to "the exercise or reservation
of powers, not rights."54 This is precisely the type of close reading that
textualism prescribes. And it also vindicates the canon of constitutional
interpretation that presumes a phrase bears the same meaning
throughout a legal text.55 What is more, given that the first ten
amendments were drafted contemporaneously, it makes good sense to

purposes. .. ."); id. at 635 (stating the Second Amendment "elevates above all other interests the right
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home").
50. Id at 579; see U.S. CONST. amend. II ("right of the people to keep and bear Arms").
51. See supranotes 38-39 and accompanying text.
52. Heller, 554 U.S. at 580.
53. Id. at 579; see U.S. CONST. amend. I ("right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government"); U.S. CONsT. amend. IV ("right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures"); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. IX (providing that the enumeration of constitutional "rights" shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by "the people"); cf Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 n.5 (noting that "the right to
assemble cannot be exercised alone, but it is still an individual right, and not one conditioned upon
membership in some defined 'assembly"').
54. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579-80 (emphases added); see U.S CONsT. preamble ("We the people");
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing that "the people" will choose members of the House); U.S. CONST.
amend. X (providing that those powers not given to the Federal Government remain with "the States" or
"the people").
55. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 170. But see id. ("[T]his [canon] assumes a perfection
of drafting that, as an empirical matter, is not often achieved.... [D]rafters more than rarely use the
same word to denote different concepts .... ).
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interpret similar phrases in those amendments in a like manner.56
Having discussed how to interpret the "right of the people" in the
Second Amendment, Justice Scalia next interpreted the substance of the
right: "to keep and bear Arms." In so doing, he applied the ordinarymeaning canon of textualism, 57 noting that "'[t]he Constitution was
written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used
in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning."' 58 What matters most is the ordinary meaning, not at the
present time but at the time a constitutional provision was adopted 59
although, in some cases, contemporary meaning is the same or similar.6 0
From this originalist perspective, Justice Scalia interpreted "Arms" as
weaponry, 6 ' "keep" as to have,6 2 and "bear" as to carry.6 3 When he
unpacked the ordinary meaning of these words, he showed how they
supported his reading of the Second Amendment, as guaranteeing an
individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.
First, in construing "Arms," Justice Scalia rejected a near-frivolous
argument that the Second Amendment protects only those arms that
existed in the 18th century. 64
This argument, he explained,
misapprehends originalism entirely6 5 : Just as the First Amendment
protects modem forms of communication,6 6 and the Fourth Amendment

56. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) ("The first ten amendments and the
original Constitution were substantially contemporaneous and should be construed in pari materia."),
overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); cf United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (reasoning that "'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment,
and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community").
57. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 69 (explaining the ordinary-meaning canon, i.e., that
"[w]ords are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings-unless the context indicates that
they bear a technical sense").
58. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931), and
citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824)).
59. See id; United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944)
("Ordinarily courts do not construe words used in the Constitution so as to give them a meaning more
narrow than one which they had in the common parlance of the times in which the Constitution was
written." (emphasis added)).
60. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 ("The 18th-century meaning [of 'Arms'] is no different
from the meaning today."); id. at 584 ("At the time of the founding, as now, to 'bear' meant to
'carry.').
61. Id. at 581.
62. Id. at 582.
63. Id. at 584.
64. Id. at 582.
65. Id. ("We do not interpret constitutional rights that way."); see also supra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text.
66. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (citing Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997),
which applied the First Amendment to the Internet); see also, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994) (applying the First Amendment to television).
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applies to modem forms of search, the Second Amendment likewise
extends to modem forms of weaponry.6 8
Next, Justice Scalia showed that the phrases "keep arms" and "bear
arms," which phrases arise from or appear in the text itself ("to keep and
bear Arms"), were not limited to having or carrying arms for militia
purposes. Indeed, the word "keep" is an embarrassment to any attempt
to imbue every word in the Second Amendment's operative clause with
an exclusively military connotation. Ordinarily, "keep" arms during the
Framing era meant to have, including to possess at home. 69 And,
historically, "keep" was the word legislatures in England and America
used in a purely individual sense to disarm certain minorities, such as
Roman Catholics, Scottish Highlanders, and blacks; legislatures forbade
them from "keeping" arms, quite apart from any military
consideration. 70 Justice Scalia made this same point in Heller-not only
in his majority opinion,7 ' but also during oral argument.7 2
Even the phrase "bear arms," by itself, has no primary or exclusive
military connotation.7 3 Although that phrase can connote military
service, "it unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning only when
followed by the preposition 'against,' which was in turn followed by the
target of the hostilities" (e.g., to bear arms against a foreign country).
This, plainly, is not how the phrase is used in the Second Amendment,

67. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-36 (2001), which
applied the Fourth Amendment to a thermal-imaging search); see also, e.g., United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that the use of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle was a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
68. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 ("[T]he Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments
that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.").
69. See, e.g., Mallock v. Eastly, 87 Eng. Rep. 1370, 1374, 7 Mod. Rep. 482 (C.P. 1744) ("[A]
man may keep a gun for the defence of his house and family.").
70. See, e.g., 1 W. & M., SESS. 1, ch. 15, § 4, in 3 ENG. STAT. AT LARGE 422 (1689) ("[N]o
papist . .. shall or may have or keep in his House ... any Arms . . . ."); Act of May 1723, ch. 4, § 14, in
4 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA (W. Hening ed., 1820) ("[No negro, mulatto, or Indian ... shall
hereafter presume to keep, or carry any gun, powder, shot, or any club, or other weapon
whatsoever. . . ."); cf 9 GEO. I, ch. 26 (1724), in 15 ENG. STAT. AT LARGE 246-47 (1765) (forbidding
Scottish Highlanders to "use or bear .. .side-pistols, or guns, or any other warlike weapons, in the
fields, or in the way coming or going to, from or at any church, market, fair, burials, huntings, meetings,
or any occasion whatsoever. . . .").
71. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582-83.
72. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 17-18, Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2008),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/07-290.pdf.
73. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 584-90; id. at 584-85 (citing "numerous instances" in which "bear
arms" was unambiguously used in the 18th century to refer to the carrying of weapons outside an
organized militia, as in self-defense); see also Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 384 (D.C. Cir.
2007) ("[T]he word 'bear' in this context is simply a more formal synonym for 'carry,' i.e., 'Beware of
Greeks bearing gifts."').
74. Id. at 586 (citing a similar example from the Declaration of Independence).
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which says the "right ... to ... bear Arms, shall not be infringed."7 5 So
Justice Scalia looked to a more analogous linguistic context, in which
nine state constitutions from the Framing era likewise protected an
arms-bearing right-that of citizens to "bear arms in defense of
themselves and the state."7 These state constitutional provisions have
long been understood to secure, in relevant part, a natural right to defend
one's self and home.
Justice Scalia therefore reasoned that the
ordinary meaning of the phrase "bear arms" suggests the carrying of a
weapon for "offensive or defensive action" but "in no way connotes
participation in a structured military organization."78 After all, a civilian
may bear arms in self-defense, as when he carries a gun to protect his
home against a burglar.
In any event, because the Second Amendment protects the right to
"keep and bear Arms," the phrase "bear Arms" cannot be viewed in
isolation but must be interpreted in relation to the word "keep." This is
a basic principle of textualism: that words and phrases should be read in
proper context.8 0 In Heller, the respondent's brief neatly illustrated how
75. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
76. Heller, 554 U.S. at 584-85 n.8 (citing Framing-era constitutions of Pennsylvania, Vermont,
Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Mississippi, Connecticut, Alabama, and Missouri).
77. Id. at 585 (citing 18th- and 19th-century commentators).
78. Id. at 584. Justice Stevens, in dissent, concluded that a conscientious-objector clause in
James Madison's original draft of the Second Amendment is proof that the Framers intended "bear
Arms" to refer only to military service. Id. at 659-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, noting the
perils of attempting to divine meaning from a provision deleted during drafting, countered that, in any
event, the most natural reading of Madison's deleted text did not support the dissent's sweeping
conclusion. Id. at 590; ef Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 147 (2005) ("Failed legislative
proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation . . . ." (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted)). Moreover, other evidence from the drafting history--still questionable as
an interpretive aid-reinforces the individual nature of the arms-bearing right in question. Madison,
who drafted the Second Amendment, proposed it not as an amendment to Article I, Section 8, clauses 15
and 16-the so-called militia clauses-but to Article I, Section 9, which secures individual rights to
habeas corpus and against bills of attainder and ex postfacto laws. 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1026 (1971); Harold S. Herd, A Re-Examination of the
FirearmsRegulation Debate and Its Consequences, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 196, 207 (1997). This suggests
that Congress contemplated that the Second Amendment would protect an individual right that went
beyond the militia context. What is more, the Senate specifically rejected a proposal to qualify "the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms" with the phrase "for the common defense." 2 SCHWARTZ,
supra, at 1038; see also STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 55 (1984); Herd, supra,at 207-08.
79. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (noting a handgun "can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while
the other hand dials the police"). Relatedly, before James Madison drafted the Second Amendment, he
introduced in the Virginia Assembly a hunting bill, written by Thomas Jefferson, that used the phrase
"bear a gun" in a non-military sense. A Bill for Preservationof Deer (1785), in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 443-44 (J. Boyd ed., 1950) ("[If,within twelve months after the date of the recognizance he
shall beara gun out of his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty, it shall be deemed a
breach of the recognizance, . . . and every such bearing of a gun shall be a breach of the new
recognizance. . . ." (emphases added)).
80. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 167 ("Context is a primary determinant of meaning.
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this interpretive canon applies to the full phrase "keep and bear Arms"
in the Second Amendment:
[E]ven if "bear arms" had a purely military connotation, that
idiomatic meaning would itself be transformed by inclusion of
the word "keep." For example, "Mary knows how to stir the
pot" conveys a meaning (i.e., cause trouble) very different
from, "Mary knows how to hold and stir the pot" (i.e., cook). 8'
Justice Scalia made a similar point in the Heller opinion, arguing that
the dissenters were attempting to cram an idiomatic meaning at the end
of the phrase "keep and bear Arms" that "would be rather like saying
'He filled and kicked the bucket' to mean 'He filled the bucket and

died."'82

Such a reading would offend textualism, which looks for the most
natural reading based on proper context. Justice Scalia read the phrase
"keep and bear Arms" most naturally to provide two interrelated
guarantees-one to keep arms, another to bear them.83 Even though the
Second Amendment refers to a singular "right," he explained that this
reading makes sense given that "[s]tate constitutions of the founding
period routinely grouped multiple (related) guarantees under a singular
'right,' and the First Amendment protects the 'right [singular] of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."' 84 Indeed, reading the Second Amendment to
include two guarantees under a singular "right" comports with
textualism. 85
Justice Scalia then put all these textual elements together to arrive at
the meaning of the Second Amendment's operative clause: a
constitutional imperative not to infringe upon "the individual right to
A legal instrument typically contains many interrelated parts .... ); Scalia, supra note 4, at 37 ("In
textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us ... to give words
and phrases an expansive rather than narrow interpretation-though not an interpretation that the
language will not bear.").
81. Brief for Resp't, Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, 2008 WL 336304, at *14 (U.S.
Feb. 4, 2008).
82. Heller, 554 U.S. at 587 (dismissing as "[g]rotesque" any attempt to read the word "Arms" to
have "two different meanings at once: 'weapons' (as the object of 'keep') and (as the object of 'bear')
one-half of an idiom" related to military service).
83. See id. at 582 (considering "the phrases 'keep arms' and 'bear arms'" separately); id at 591
(rejecting the dissenters' view that "keep and bear" is a unitary phrase).
84. Id. at 591 (citing the Pennsylvania and Ohio constitutions, and quoting the First
Amendment). The Sixth Amendment "right to a speedy and public trial" offers another useful analogy
in this respect. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 648 (1992)
(considering the speedy-trial guarantee); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1984) (elaborating on
the public-trial guarantee).
85. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 129 (noting that, under the number canon, "the singular
includes the plural"); see id. at 130 (explaining how, as a general matter, "the proposition that one
includes multiple ones" is "logically inevitable").
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possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." 86 He recognized
that the operative clause did not grant this right but declared only that it
"shall not be infringed," meaning the Second Amendment, like the First
and the Fourth Amendments, enshrines a "pre-existing right."" This
close reading is thoroughly textualist. To determine the content of this
pre-existing right, he consulted in particular the writings of William
Blackstone, to whom the Framers were devoted.
Significantly,
Blackstone described the right not as one limited in any way to military
service, but as 'the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,"' 89
and "'the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and
This historical approach is, as explained in the
defence."' 90
Introduction, also textualist-more precisely, originalist. Thus, based
on "both text and history," Justice Scalia in Heller read the Second
Amendment's operative clause to confer an individual (not collective)
right to keep and bear arms. 9'
B. The Prefatory Clause of the Second Amendment
Justice Scalia next interpreted the Second Amendment's prefatory
clause, which reads: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State. ... "2 He showed how the prefatory
(dependent) clause fits comfortably with his interpretation of the
operative (independent) clause. Once again relying on textual elements
and historical aids, he construed words and phrases in the prefatory
clause as they would have been understood during the Framing era:
"Militia" as all able-bodied males within a certain age range acting in
concert for the common defense; 93 "well regulated" as properly
86. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
87. Id.; see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) ("This is not a right
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its
existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed . . . ."); cf U.S. CONST.
amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging" enumerated rights); U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(enumerated right "shall not be violated").
88. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593-94; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (recognizing
that Blackstone's works "constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding
generation").
89. Heller,554 U.S. at 594 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE *139 (1765)).
90. Id. (quoting I BLACKSTONE *140; 3 BLACKSTONE *2-4 (1768)).
91. Id. at 595.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
93. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939), a Framingera dictionary, and the writings of Madison and Jefferson); id. at 580 (noting that "the 'militia' in
colonial America consisted of a subset of 'the people'). But see AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 51
(1998) (arguing that the "militia" was identical to "the people" during the founding era). Justice Scalia
distinguished the militia from the organized militia: "Although the militia consists of all able-bodied
men, the federally organized militia may consist of a subset of them." Heller, 554 U.S. at 596. Today,
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disciplined and trained; 94 and "security of a free State" as the safety of a
free country. 95 For the Framing generation, an effective militia was
indispensable to freedom because history had taught them, as Justice
Scalia noted in Heller, "that the way tyrants had eliminated a militia
consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by banning the militia but
simply by taking away the people's arms, enabling a select militia or
standing army to suppress political opponents." 96 Thus, the Second
Amendment's prefatory and operative clauses fit together "perfectly"97 :
Given that the Framing generation needed a militia to preserve freedom,
the individual right to have and carry arms shall not be infringed.9 8
This reading of the Second Amendment's whole text makes good
sense from a textualist perspective.99 As does Justice Scalia's originalist
emphasis on Blackstone and other historical sources, which led him to
conclude that "the central component" of the Second Amendment right
is "individual self-defense." 00 He also relied on such historical sources
the militia comprises all able-bodied males from age 17 to 45 who are or intend to become citizens, and
female citizens who are members of the National Guard. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2006).
94. Heller, 554 U.S. at 597 (citing a Framing-era dictionary, treatise, and state declaration of
rights). But see Patrick J. Charles, Essay, Scribble Scrabble, the Second Amendment, and Historical
Guideposts: A Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Malcolm, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1821,
1822 (2011) (arguing "'well regulated militia' does not merely equate to 'well-trained"'); id at 1836
(suggesting a "'well regulated militia' was a state-sanctioned constitutional body of citizens" (footnote
omitted)).
95. Heller, 554 U.S. at 597 (noting that the phrase "security of a free state" appears to have been
a term of art in 18th-century political discourse, and that "other instances of 'state' in the
Constitution . .. show[] that the word 'state' did not have a single meaning in the Constitution"). This is
an instance where, contrary to the general rule, a term is not used consistently in a legal text. See supra
note 55.
96. Heller, 554 U.S. at 598. This is precisely what happened in England under the Stuart Kings,
prompting codification of the right of Protestants to have arms in the English Bill of Rights. Id. at 59295 (surveying English history).
97. Id at 598.
98. Id. at 599 (observing that "[tjhe prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia
was the only reason" to secure the individual right to keep and bear arms); see also id ("It was
understood across the political spectrum that the right [to keep and bear arms] helped to secure the ideal
of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional
order broke down."); cf Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) ("The Second Amendment is a doomsday provision, one designed for
those exceptionally rare circumstances ... where the government refuses to stand for reelection and
silences those who protest; where courts have lost the courage to oppose, or can find no one to enforce
their decrees.").
99. See ScALiA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 167 ("The text must be construed as a whole.").
From a textualist perspective, if the Framers had wanted to secure only a collective right to arms for the
common defense, they could have done so more directly, for example, by providing that "Congress shall
pass no law disarming the state militias," or "States have a right to a well-regulated militia." Parker v.
Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
100. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599; see id at 582-83, 592-629 (relying heavily on historical references);
see, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036-44 (2010) (plurality opinion) (following
Heller's originalist approach and holding that the Second Amendment is incorporated against the
States); id. at 3050-58 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rebutting Justice Stevens's critique of the majority's
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to make the related point that the Second Amendment's "core
protection" is "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms
in defense of hearth and home.""o" Up until this point in Heller, Justice
Scalia was in his approach to the Second Amendment thoroughly and
persuasively textualist-originalist. He was less so, however, when he
defined the scope of the Second Amendment right in a rather
indeterminate manner, as discussed in the next part.
III. THE INDETERMINATE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS
In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Scalia rightly recognized

that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is not
absolute.102 It has never been unlimited, not at the time of the Framing
and thus not today. 0 3 The Second Amendment, Justice Scalia
explained, enshrined a pre-existing right that was subject to "important
limitation[s]"; 104 it plainly was not a right to have and carry any weapon
in any manner for any purpose.0 5 That is, in colonial times, one had a
right to keep and bear only certain weapons in certain manners for
certain purposes. And Justice Scalia emphasized that the same weapon-

manner-and-purpose limitations that applied in the Framing era still
apply today.106 This reasoning from Heller reflects his longtime
originalist understanding that constitutional provisions enshrine not the
"current meaning" but the "original meaning" of a right, as understood
by the Framing generation.107 So far, so good.
But, at this point in Heller, Justice Scalia strayed somewhat from
originalism, which is an integral part of his textualist interpretive

philosophy.108 He did so, arguably, when he articulated two important
limitations on the Second Amendment right: (A) "presumptively lawful

theory of interpretation).
101. Heller,554 U.S. at 635; see also Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir.
2012) ("Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith within the home.").
102. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia drew a useful analogy with the First
Amendment: "[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for
any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to
speak for any purpose." Id. at 595.
103. See id. at 626-28; id. at 634-35 ("Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they
were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even
future judges think that scope too broad.").
104. Id. at 627.
105. Id. at 626 (stating that the right to have arms "was not a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose").
106. See id. at 626-28.
107. Scalia, supra note 4, at 38 (noting "the Great Divide with regard to constitutional
interpretation is ... that between originalmeaning .. . and current meaning").
108. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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regulatory measures" on the general exercise of the right;'o and (B) the
right to keep and bear only those weapons "'in common use at the
time."'n 0 The first limitation can be easily reconciled with originalism,
the second not so much. What follows is a discussion of how the first
limitation squares with originalism and how, by contrast, the second
offends Justice Scalia's originalist view that constitutional rights
generally should not be left open-ended."'
A. Presumptively Lawful Regulatory Measures

The first limitation broadly pertains to who can have arms, where they
can carry them, and how they can carry and buy them. Nothing in the
Heller opinion, Justice Scalia said, "should be taken to cast doubt on
longstandingprohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."' 2 He
described these as "presumptively lawful regulatory measures" and
clarified that the list was merely illustrative, not exhaustive." 3
Although he characterized these regulatory measures as "longstanding,"
many do not date back to the Framing era. Several courts and
commentators have recognized this fact,"l 4 some noting that, for this
109. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26; accord id at 626-27.
110. Id at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
111. Arguably, as seen in the text below, both limitations on the Second Amendment right were
dicta in Heller, as neither necessarily affected the outcome of that case. In Heller, the Supreme Court
invalidated regulations that prevented a police officer from having and using handguns for self-defense
in his home. Id at 629. Thus, unlike regulations on gun ownership by felons or gun possession in
schools, the regulations in Heller were not presumptively valid; and, regardless whether the Second
Amendment protects weapons in common use for self-defense at the present time, or weapons that can
be traced back to those in common use for self-defense at the time of the Framing, handguns would
likely be protected either way (both as popular weapons for self-defense today and as "lineal
descendants" of the colonial pistol). However, even if these limitations are dicta in Heller, they are
Supreme Court dicta that lower courts cannot simply ignore and will generally adopt. See, e.g., Peterson
v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 2013) ("[W]e are bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as
firmly as by the Court's outright holdings. . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
112. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 (emphasis added).
113. Id at 627 n.26. Heller did not specify whether these regulatory measures were
presumptively lawful because they target conduct categorically outside the Second Amendment's scope,
because they would pass some level of means-end constitutional scrutiny, or both. Most courts have
held that they are "presumptively lawful because they regulate conduct outside the scope of the Second
Amendment." United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010); see also, e.g., Peterson,
707 F.3d at 1201; Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 203 (5th Cir. 2012).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Eugene
Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework
and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REv. 1443, 1493-1549 (2009); Carlton F.W. Larson, Four
Exceptions in Search ofA Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and JudicialIpse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 3

812

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

reason, "an originalist argument that proceeded by identifying specific
eighteenth-century analogues to modem.. . regulations would be
extremely difficult to make." 1 s Fair enough, but this does not conflict
with Justice Scalia's originalist approach.
For Justice Scalia, an originalist "must follow the trajectory of the
[Second] Amendment, so to speak, to determine what it requires-and
assuredly that enterprise is not entirely cut-and-dried but requires the
exercise of judgment."ll 6 Although Justice Scalia in Heller declined to
"undertake an exhaustive historical analysis ... of the full scope of the
Second Amendment.. .,"" 7 the longstanding (albeit not Framing-era)
regulatory measures he identified in that opinion appear to fall well
within the "trajectory" of the Second Amendment." 8 Over the past two
centuries, courts have upheld such regulatory measures under the
Second Amendment and state analogues.' 19 On a related note, Justice
Scalia specifically noted that prohibitions on carrying concealed
weapons were likewise upheld as far back as the 19th century.120
What is more, the absence of "specific" 18th-century analogues to
modem regulations should not prevent an originalist from reasoning by
general analogies to history and tradition.121 For example, prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally infirm broadly
comport with provisions in the English Bill of Rights that guaranteed
arms to English subjects but only as "' Suitable to their condition and as

L.J. 1371, 1376-80 (2009).
115. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 114, at 1379 (referring specifically to commercial gun
regulations) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1376 ("[F]elon disarmament laws significantly postdate
both the Second Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. An originalist argument that sought to
identify 1791 or 1868 analogues to felon disarmament laws would be quite difficult to make.").
116. See Scalia, supra note 4, at 45 (initially offering this explanation in the related First
Amendment context) (emphasis added).
117. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
118. Relatedly, Justice Scalia surveyed how courts and commentators viewed the Second
Amendment from the post-ratification to post-Civil War periods. Id. at 605-19.
119. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 114, at 1524-33, 1538-49 (collecting cases on regulations
related to sensitive places and commercial sales); see also Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 & n.8
(1980) (upholding prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons, as such "legislative restrictions
on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon
any constitutionally protected liberties").
120. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; see Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897) (upholding
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons, because "the right of the people to keep and bear arms
(article 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons .... ).
121. See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen
legislatures seek to address ... new gun regulations because of conditions that have not traditionally
existed, ... the proper interpretive approach is to reason by analogy from history and tradition."); cf
Larson, supra note 114, at 1379 ("The absence of commercial regulation in the eighteenth century does
not necessarily mean, of course, that the original public meaning of the Second Amendment precluded
such regulation.").

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/3

18

Schaerer: What the Heller?: An Originalist Critique of Justice Scalia's Sec

WHAT THE HELLER?

2014]

813

allowed by Law."'l 22 Thus, these prohibitions generally adhere to
Justice Scalia's originalist understanding that the Second Amendment
protects the rights of "law-abiding, responsible citizens."' 23 For this
reason, originalists like Judge Frank Easterbrook "take from Heller the
message that exclusions need not mirror limits that were on the books in
1791," when the Second Amendment was adopted. 24
Judge
Easterbrook also noted: "It would be weird to say that [a newer gun law]
is unconstitutional in 2010 but will become constitutional by 2043,
when it will be as 'longstanding' as [an older gun law] was when the
Court decided Heller."l25 For an originalist, a right should not be so
indeterminate as to permit dramatic shifts in the constitutionality of
regulations over time. Time should not be the decisive factor.
Accordingly, because the "presumptively lawful regulatory measures"
listed in Heller track the trajectory of the Second Amendment and
approximate general (albeit not specific) regulatory analogues from the
Framing era, this first limitation on the right to keep and bear arms
squares with broad principles of originalism.
B. Weapons in Common Use at the Time
The second limitation that Justice Scalia identified in Heller is on
what weapons qualify for constitutional protection. He said that "the
Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not tpically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. .. " 26 He
derived this limitation on the right to keep and bear arms from the
Court's 1939 decision in UnitedStates v. Miller,127 which had rejected a
Second Amendment challenge to federal regulations on short-barreled
shotguns.128 In Heller,Justice Scalia relied on Miller for the proposition
that "the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common use at the
time,"'l 29 and affirmed this limitation as "fairly supported by the
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual
weapons."' 13 0 He cautioned against overreliance on Miller, which he
described as "an uncontested and virtually unreasoned case,""a' but he
122. Heller, 554 U.S. at 664 (quoting L. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at

295, 297 (1981)).
123. Id. at 635.
124. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
125. Id.
126. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.

127. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 178.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).
Id (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE *148-49 and citing other sources).
Id at 624 n.24 (criticizing Justice Stevens for reading too much into Miller).
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nonetheless took a noteworthy lesson from it: "The traditional militia
was formed from a pool of men bringing arms 'in common use at the
time' for lawful purposes like self-defense."l 32 This, he suggested, is
why Miller had refused Second Amendment protection for shortbarreled shotguns: "'the absence of any evidence tending to show that
the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia ...

,

presumably because such a weapon was not in

common use at the time Miller was decided in 1939.134
This second limitation, unlike the first one, cannot be reconciled with
originalism quite so easily. The reason is that the relevant time in the
common-use inquiry, as articulated in Miller and adopted by Heller (i.e.,
whether a weapon is "in common use at the time"), appears to be the
present time-rather than the time the Second Amendment (for federal
gun laws) or the Fourteenth Amendment (for state and local gun laws)
was adopted.13 5 In other words, Justice Scalia's discussion in Heller
strongly implies that, to determine whether a specific weapon merits
Second Amendment protection, a court must ask whether that weapon is
in common use at the time the court is considering the issue, rather than
whether it was in common use (or is similar to what was in common
use) at the time the Second and Fourteenth Amendments were adopted
in 1791 and 1868, respectively.1 36
In Heller, Justice Scalia apparently adopted this present-time inquiry.
He noted, in dictum, that the Second Amendment would not protect
sophisticated arms not in common use for lawful civilian purposes at the
time Heller was decided in 2008-even if "[i]t may well be true today
that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would
require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large."' 37
He also appeared to adopt Miller's present-time inquiry when he struck
down the handgun ban at issue in Heller: "[H]andguns are the most
popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and
This statement is
a complete prohibition of their use is invalid." 3
132. Id. at 624 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).
133. Id. at 622 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178) (emphasis added by author).
134. Id. at 625 (reading Miller to hold that the Second Amendment does not protect weapons,
"such as short-barreled shotguns," that are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes).
135. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038-42 (2010) (plurality opinion)
(incorporating the Second Amendment against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment).
136. Id; see Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) ("McDonald confirms
that when state-or local-government action is challenged, the focus of the original-meaning inquiry is
carried forward in time; the Second Amendment's scope as a limitation on the States depends on how
the right was understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.").
137. Heller,554 U.S. at 627-28 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 629 (emphasis added); see also id at 628 ("The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition
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vague as to time, but almost certainly refers to the popularity of
handguns at the time Heller was decided. Not surprisingly, the Eighth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all interpreted Heller to establish a
present-time inquiry of what weapons are in common use for lawful
purposes.139 Among the Federal Courts of Appeals, only the Fourth
Circuit has, in a footnote and as dictum, read Heller to protect weapons
in common use at the time of the Framing, setting the stage for a circuit
split as to the proper scope of the Second Amendment right announced
in Heller.140 Commentators have adopted the view of the majority of
courts, reading Heller to require a present-time inquiry (instead of a
Framing-era inquiry).14 1 Even Justice Breyer's dissent in Heller
understood Justice Scalia's discussion as setting forth a present-time
inquiry.142
Did, it is fair to ask, Justice Scalia betray originalism by adopting a
present-time inquiry of what weapons are protected "Arms" within the
meaning of the Second Amendment? There are reasons to believe he
did.143 First, the present-time inquiry is at odds with Justice Scalia's
of an entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [self-defense]."
(emphasis added)). Here, the use of the present tense is rather telling.
139. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("[B]ased upon the record as it stands, we
cannot be certain whether these weapons are commonly used or are useful specifically for self-defense
or hunting and therefore whether the prohibition of certain semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding
more than ten rounds meaningfully affect the right to keep and bear arms."); United States v. Tagg,
572 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Unlike the handguns in Heller, pipe bombs are not typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."); United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874
(8th Cir. 2008) ("Machine guns are not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and
therefore fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit
for individual use.").
140. United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 246 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012). In Pruess, the court relied
primarily on Heller's discussion of presumptively lawful regulations to hold that the application of a
felon-in-possession prohibition did not violate the Second Amendment. Id. at 245-47. As an aside, the
court noted that the particular felon's arsenal of military-grade weapons and explosives counseled
against finding his conduct to be within the scope of the Second Amendment, "based on the statement in
Heller that 'the sorts of weapons' the Amendment protects are 'those in common use at the time' of
ratification-not 'dangerous and unusual weapons,' which there is a 'historical tradition of
prohibiting."' Id. at 246 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627).
141. See, e.g., Rostron, supranote 36, at 712.
142. Heller, 554 U.S. at 720-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143. Of course, Justice Scalia insisted that he had construed the Second Amendment as it would
have been understood by "ordinary citizens in the founding generation." Id. at 576-77; see also United
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 675 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that Heller took an originalist approach); cf
William G. Merkel, Essay, The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia 's Perverse Sense of
Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 349, 349 (2009) (dismissing Heller as "a garden variety case
of originalism manqud, i.e. an effort to pin point a single original understanding when in fact meaning
was hotly contested at the time constitutional text was created"). But some have suggested that the
Heller opinion reflects a compromise, in which Justice Scalia made certain doctrinal concessions to win
Justice Anthony Kennedy's vote, so that the opinion would "speak for a united majority of five Justices
rather than a mere plurality of four." See Rostron, supra note 36, at 713 (noting speculation over this
point).
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own originalist view that the scope of constitutional rights generally
should not be left to the whims of future generations. Long before
Heller, Justice Scalia pointed out this basic principle of
constitutionalism:
It certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally suggests
changeability; to the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent
change-to embed certain rights in such a manner that future
generations cannot readily take them away. A society that

adopts a bill of rights is skeptical that 'evolving standards of
decency' always 'mark progress,' and that societies always
'mature,' as opposed to rot.
The present-time inquiry defies this originalist understanding; it creates
a right that later generations can easily take away. It does so by
subjecting the right to keep and bear arms to a present-day popularity
contest, by which a court will extend Second Amendment protection
only if the weapon at issue is in common use at the time in questionthat is, at some ever-changing "present" time. This means that the
Second Amendment right is not fixed (and extended by analogy to new
technologies over time) but forever depends on the behavior of current
and future generations. If, for example, a generation of Americans were
to stop buying, having, and using handguns for self-defense-such that
even handguns were no longer typically used by law-abiding citizens for
lawful civilian purposes-then the right to use handguns for self-defense
would therefore be extinguished for that generation.145 That is, any
generation could at any time simply nullify the right that Justice Scalia
recognized in Heller. In this way, the present-time inquiry essentially
imports "evolving standards of decency"-which Justice Scalia so
eschews-through the backdoor. 146
Justice Scalia should be the first to object to the present-time inquiry
on this ground. Well before Heller, he described the Second
Amendment as a constitutional guarantee against later generations who,
144. Scalia, supra note 4, at 40-41 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981))
(emphasis added). Notably, Justice Scalia expressed a similar point in Heller: "Constitutional rights are
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not
future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad." Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35.
145. See Rostron, supra note 36, at 712 ("If a weapon was widely used and originally understood
to be within the scope of the right to keep and bear arms, why should it lose its constitutional protection
merely because the number of its users dwindles over the years?").
146. To be clear, the "evolving standards of decency" that Justice Scalia eschews in constitutional
law refer to evolving normative standards, not descriptive circumstances. Originalism, by Justice
Scalia's own account, accepts normative principles enshrined in the Constitution as fixed but fully
recognizes that technologies and behaviors change over time. See supranotes 11-12 and accompanying
text. An originalist simply asks how such changing technologies and behaviors fit within the trajectory
of a fixed normative standard-here, the original meaning undergirding a constitutional guarantee. See
id
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unlike the Framing generation, might undervalue the fundamental right
to keep and bear arms for self-defense:
[W]e value the right to bear arms less than did the Founders
(who thought the right of self-defense to be absolutely
fundamental) .... But this just shows that the Founders were
right when they feared that some (in their view misguided)
future generation might wish to abandon liberties that they
considered essential, and so sought to protect those liberties in a
Bill of Rights.147
In other words, Justice Scalia specifically acknowledged in his preHeller writings that future generations may undervalue the Second
Amendment right, putting the whole right in jeopardy if its entire
existence hinged on whether such generations exercised and thus
preserved the right.14 8 This understanding makes his adoption of the
present-time inquiry in Heller all the more bewildering. As an
originalist, Justice Scalia should be skeptical of a right that expands or
contracts based on a present-day popularity contest-not only because it
gives a blank check to later generations, but also because it provides the
Justice Breyer noted this
government with a perverse incentive.
perverse incentive in his dissent from Heller:
On the majority's reasoning, if tomorrow someone invents a
particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense weapon,
Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for once
it becomes popular Congress will no longer possess the
constitutional authority to do so. In essence, the majority
determines what regulations are permissible by looking to see
what existing regulations permit. There is no basis for
believing that the Framers intended such circular reasoning.149
147. Scalia, supra note 4, at 43. On a related note, the generation that adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment, which incorporated the Second Amendment against the States, valued the right to keep and
bear arms less as a bulwark against a tyrannical government and more as a weapon for self-defense.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038 (2010) (plurality opinion) ("By the 1850's, the
perceived threat that had prompted the inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights-the
fear that the National Government would disarm the universal militia-had largely faded as a popular
concern, but the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of self-defense.").
148. Similarly, the First Amendment right to free speech has not been interpreted to hinge on
whether a particular generation voices a given message. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
271 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment's "protection does not turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered"' (quoting NAACP. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445
(1963))). But the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches has, by contrast, been
interpreted to hinge on whether society at the time has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a certain
area. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (holding that "society is [now]
prepared to accept" a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage area immediately surrounding a
home).
149. Heller, 554 U.S. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Rostron, supra note 36, at 712
("Scalia's approach gives governments an incentive to ban new types of weapons as soon as they
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Next, the present-time inquiry is at odds with the way that Justice Scalia
has applied originalism to other constitutional guarantees, including the
First Amendment right to free speech, the Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection. This tension is most stark in view of his
approach to the First Amendment, for which he has flatly rejected an
indeterminate conception of the right to free speech:
It makes a lot of sense to guarantee to a society that "the
freedom of speech you now enjoy (whatever that consists of)
will never be diminished by the federal government"; it makes
very little sense to guarantee that "the federal government will
respect the moral principle of freedom of speech, which may
entitle you to more, or less, freedom of speech than you now
legally enjoy." 150
Why should it be any different with the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms? And yet the present-time inquiry essentially does
for the Second Amendment what Justice Scalia has said makes "very
little sense" for the First Amendment; the present-time inquiry protects
only weapons in common use at a given time, which may entitle us to
more, or less, of a right to keep and bear arms than we now legally
enjoy. By Justice Scalia's own account, it would make far more sense
to guarantee whatever gun rights Americans enjoyed against the federal
government when the Second Amendment was adopted in 1791, or that
they enjoyed against state and local governments when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted in 1868.5' In this way, the constitutional
guarantee to keep and bear arms would not be diminished over time.
And it would be extended to new technologies only if they were
analogous to longtime protected weapons and only if regulation of those
technologies failed the proper level of constitutional scrutiny (which
should not happen for regulation of the most dangerous, military-grade
weapons).152 This approach is decidedly more originalist than one that
decides the content of the Second Amendment based on what weapons
are presently in common use for lawful civilian purposes.
As with the First Amendment right to free speech, Justice Scalia has
appear, so that they never become common enough to receive constitutional protection."). Under the
present-time inquiry, one could also imagine taxes used to incentivize would-be gun owners to purchase
some weapons over others, such that the other weapons fall out of use and thus lose any Second
Amendment protection.
150. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

LAW 129, 148 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
151. Recall that the Second Amendment has been incorporated against the States via the
Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036-44.
152. For more on how, from an originalist perspective, the Second Amendment should be applied
to current and future weapons, see infra Part HI.C.
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also rejected an indeterminate conception of the Eighth Amendment
right against cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment, he
has long insisted, "means not ... whatever may be considered cruel
from one generation to the next, but. . . " what the Framing generation
considered cruel when the Eighth Amendment was adopted.153
Otherwise, he explained, the Eighth Amendment "would be no
protection against the moral perceptions of a future, more brutal,
generation. It is, in other words, rooted in the moral perceptions of the
time."1 54 Justice Scalia believes that a right, if it is to have any effect at
all, must not be tethered to the perceptions of some indeterminate time
in the future, but must be fixed in the perceptions of the time in which
the right was adopted. By extension, unless the Second Amendment
protects weapons similar to those in common use in 1791 or 1868, it
likewise would offer little (if any) protection against the attitudes of a
future generation more skeptical of gun rights.
Similarly, Justice Scalia thinks that the Fourteenth Amendment right
to equal protection should be rooted in original meaning. He has long
said that he answers questions about what constitutes a denial of equal
protection "on the basis of the 'time-dated' meaning of equal protection
in 1868," when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.'5 5 Why, then,
should he not do the same for the "time-dated" meaning of the right to
keep and bear arms? As seen above, his general originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation lends itself not to the Heller inquiry of what
weapons are in common use at the present time, but to an inquiry that
asks what weapons were in common use at two decisive moments in
time: 1791 for the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms visA-vis the federal government, and 1868 for the Fourteenth Amendment
right to keep and bear arms vis-A-vis state and local governments. Thus,
the present-time inquiry that Justice Scalia apparently adopted in Heller
renders the Second Amendment right far too indeterminate to square
with his originalist interpretive philosophy.
In rebuttal, Justice Scalia may insist that Heller's present-time inquiry
indeed reflects the original, Framing-era understanding of the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. He said so in Heller, noting
that the Court was "adopt[ing] . . . the original understanding of the

Second Amendment."' 5 6
If this were so, however, the Second
Amendment right would itself have to be indeterminate: an open-ended
153. Scalia, supranote 150, at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted).

154. Id.
155. Id. at 148-49.
156. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008); see also id at 576-77 (claiming to
interpret the Second Amendment as it would have been understood by "ordinary citizens in the founding
generation").
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right that was understood to vary from generation to generation,
depending on what weapons were in common use for each generation.
Given what Justice Scalia has said about the purpose behind the Bill of
Rights-to guarantee a minimum baseline of fundamental rights that
future generations could not readily take away-this seems rather
unlikely. But it is possible. Originalism, Justice Scalia has explained,
recognizes that a term in a written law can "clearly connote[] a category
that changes from decade to decade," such as, for example, the term
"endangered species" in an environmental statute.' 57 But he gave this
example to draw an important contrast, specifically noting that the term
"cruel punishments" in the Eighth Amendment does not connote such an
ever-changing category.' 58
And he does not interpret other
constitutional rights to be so open-ended, as the moral principles that
undergird those rights, "most of us think, are permanent." 59 He thus
should not have suggested in Heller that the Second Amendment
protects only those weapons in common use at the present time. By
doing so, he rendered the right indeterminate.
Alternatively, Justice Scalia may have meant, but failed to clarify,
that the Second Amendment protects weapons in common use not at the
present time but at the time of the Framing.16 0 Justice Scalia may well
insist that this is what he meant to say in Heller. But even if we were to
assume that this is what he in fact meant to say, his discussion in Heller
suggests otherwise and, as noted above, is fairly read to establish a

157. Scalia, supra note 150, at 146.
158. Id (noting that "Americans of 1791 ... were embedding in the Bill of Rights their moral
values, for otherwise all its general and abstract guarantees could be brought to nought").
159. Id. Justice Scalia eschews moral indeterminacy as a basis for interpreting constitutional
rights. Id. at 148. Still, he might argue that the moral principle behind the Second Amendment right is
permanent, the principle being simply to allow law-abiding citizens in each generation to keep and bear
whatever weapons they typically used for lawful purposes. Put another way, Justice Scalia may argue
that, while referencing weapons used today, he is still employing the categorization envisioned by the
Framing generation. On this basis, he could argue that his conception of the Second Amendment right
is not morally indeterminate, just empirically indeterminate (i.e., subject to an empirical, not moral,
assessment of the weapons in common use at any given time that would fit within that categorization).
But this argument would still leave originalist objections to Heller's present-time inquiry, discussed in
the text above, largely unanswered. This may well be an instance where originalism simply admits
disagreement about the original meaning and how it applies. See Scalia, supra note 4, at 45.
160. Another possibility is that Justice Scalia intentionally left this common-use inquiry open for
the lower courts to clarify, just as he did with the proper level of scrutiny to be applied depending on
whether a challenged regulation infringes a core or non-core right to keep and bear arms. See Heller,
554 U.S. at 628-30, 634-35. The lower courts have already begun to diverge as to the common-use
inquiry in particular. The Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits asked what weapons were in common use
at the time each court considered the Second Amendment challenge at issue, see supra note 139,
whereas the Fourth Circuit asked (albeit in dicta) what weapons were in common use at the time of the
Framing, see supra note 140. Before this circuit split materializes or deepens, the Supreme Court
should weigh in and provide needed clarification.
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present-time inquiry.16 1 Many courts and commentators-originalists
and nonoriginalists alike-have understood Heller to adopt such an
inquiry.162 And that inquiry, as demonstrated above, is decidedly
nonoriginalist.
C An Alternative, More OriginalistApproach

If, by adopting the present-time inquiry in Heller, Justice Scalia
strayed from originalism, how then should an originalist apply the
Second Amendment to various weapons? Consider an alternative, more
originalist inquiry that includes three important questions: (1) whether
the weapon at issue is a "bearable arm" (i.e., a weapon that can be
carried); (2) whether that weapon is a "lineal descendant" of one that
was in common use when the relevant constitutional provisions were
adopted (i.e., a weapon that can be traced back to a commonly-used
equivalent from the Revolutionary or Reconstruction era, depending on
whether a federal or state/local regulation is at issue); and (3) whether
regulation of that weapon passes the proper level of means-end
constitutional scrutiny (i.e., intermediate or strict scrutiny, depending on
whether the regulation intrudes on conduct central or peripheral to the
fundamental right to keep and bear arms).163
161. Justice Scalia, of all people, should know that when he writes words down in a judicial
opinion, they no longer belong to him. It does not matter what he meant to say in Heller; it matters only
what he said. Cf Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011) (per
Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, J.) ("Whatever [respondent] thinks the Court of Appeals meant to say,
what it said was [something else] .... We take the Court of Appeals at its word. Based on those words,
the decision below cannot stand.").
162. See supranotes 35-37, 139, 141-142, and accompanying text.
163. Here, the "lineal descendancy" inquiry raises the possibility that, for gun regulation, the
normal rules of federalism will be reversed. Normally, state governments have more authority than the
federal government to regulate guns. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 & n.3 (1995)
(holding Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause to criminalize gun possession in a
school zone because, in part, it encroached on areas of public safety and health traditionally subject to
state regulation). But under the "lineal descendancy" inquiry, given that the universe of arms was less
technologically advanced in 1791 versus 1868, state and local governments may arguably have less
power than the federal government to regulate or ban firearms (because "lineal descendancy" for
modem weapons may be more easily established as to Reconstruction-era weaponry versus
Revolutionary-era arms). See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text. But if self-defense weapons
in common use in 1868 were merely "lineal descendants" of such weapons in 1791, the scope of the
right to keep and bear arms would be roughly the same with respect to both state and federal law. The
scope of the right would also be roughly the same if the generation adopting the Fourteenth Amendment
sought only to incorporate the arms-bearing right precisely as it was understood by the generation
adopting the Second Amendment. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 710 (7th Cir. 2011)
("[T]he Second Amendment's scope as a limitation on the States depends on how the right was
understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified." (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.
Ct. 3020, 3038-42 (2010) (plurality opinion))); cf McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 (reaffirming that
"incorporated Bill of Rights protections 'are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal
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The second step in particular, with its "lineal descendancy" inquiry, is
geared toward originalism and is aimed at tracking the "trajectory" of
the Second Amendment protection, from colonial weapons that
Americans surely meant to protect at the time of the Framing, all the
way to modem-day weapons that clearly did not exist then.164 As
argued below, this three-step, alternative approach draws insights from
Heller and its progeny, but more closely adheres to originalism.
1. Whether the Weapon Is a "Bearable Arm"
The first step in the three-step approach to a Second Amendment
challenge is to ask whether the weapon at issue is a "bearable arm."
This insight comes from Heller itself, in which Justice Scalia observed
that "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments
that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at
the time of the founding."s65 Just as the First Amendment applies to
modem forms of communication, and the Fourth Amendment applies to
modem forms of search, the Second Amendment should likewise apply
to modem forms of weaponry.' 6 6 But the emphasis here is on the
minimum thresholdfor Second Amendment protection: For a weapon to
merit any such protection at all, it must at least be bearable (in the
ordinary sense)-that is, capable of being carried on one's person. 6 7
This limitation makes good sense given that the Second Amendment
guarantees the "right to keep and bear Arms," fairly implying that the
"Arms" in question must be bearable.
Accordingly, large-scale bombs and missiles, along with modem-day
bombers and tanks, are clearly not protected under the Second
Amendment because they are not bearable arms.168
encroachment' (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)). If anything, the generation adopting the
Fourteenth Amendment had a more limited view of the Second Amendment right, also militating against
any perversion of federalism. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3038 ("By the 1850's, the perceived threat
that had prompted the inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights-the fear that the
National Government would disarm the universal militia-had largely faded as a popular concern, but
the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of self-defense."). A more in-depth
discussion of federalism and incorporation doctrines, as they apply in the Second Amendment context,
is beyond the scope of this Article.
164. Cf supra notes 116-125 and accompanying text (discussing the "trajectory" of restrictions
and prohibitions on gun ownership and use).
165. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (emphasis added). In other words, as Justice Scalia recognized, this
limit on the arms-bearing right appears on the face of the Second Amendment's text.
166. Id.
167. This definition comports with the ordinary meaning of "bear" that Justice Scalia endorsed in
Heller: to carry "'upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket . . . .' Id. at 584 (quoting Muscarello
v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)).
168. Unlike the word "bear," the word "keep" in the Second Amendment does not furnish a
similarly helpful limitation on the right in question. To keep ordinarily means to have in one's custody,
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2. Whether the Weapon Is a "Lineal Descendant" of One in Common
Use When the Second or Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted
The second question in this analysis, like the present-time inquiry in
Heller, focuses on the type of weapon at issue. But, unlike the presenttime inquiry, it does not ask whether the weapon is in common use at
the present time. Instead, it asks whether the weapon was in common
use for lawful purposes, or is the "lineal descendant" of a weapon in
common use for lawful purposes, at the time relevant constitutional

provisions were adopted. As noted above, there are two relevant
constitutional provisions here: the Second Amendment, adopted in 1791,
guarantees the right to keep and bear arms vis-A-vis the federal
government; and the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868,
incorporates that right against state and local governments.' 6 1 So the
question becomes, in most cases, whether a modem-day weapon
qualifies as a "lineal descendant" of a weapon in common use in 1791
(if a federal gun law is being challenged) or 1868 (if a state or local gun
law is being challenged).o70
There are two subparts to this inquiry: (i) a determination of whether
the weapon is a "lineal descendant" of a weapon that existed in 1791 or
1868; and (ii) a determination of whether any such Framing-era
equivalent was in common use for lawful civilian purposes during that
time.' 7' Each subpart will be further explained below. For now, the
takeaway is that this analysis comports with originalism, which asks
how new technologies fit within the fixed, original meaning of a right.' 72
In other words, an originalist should ask whether a new weapon has a
place within the trajectory of the Second Amendment. This originalist
feature of the proposed analysis guarantees, as Justice Scalia has
prescribed in the First Amendment context, that the Second Amendment
right will not be diminished beyond a minimum baseline enjoyed by the
Framing generation. 73

as Justice Scalia recognized in Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, and anyone could have in custody (at least in
theory) even the largest bombers and tanks.
169. See supra notes 34 and 136.
170. One would expect few challenges to regulation over colonial pistols and muskets, either
because such regulation is not robust, such weapons are not often relied on for self-defense, or both.
Most challenges will be to regulation over modern-day weaponry.
171. As used here, Framing era can refer to either 1791, when the Second Amendment was
adopted, or 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
172. See supra note 11-12 and accompanying text; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at
78 ("Although courts routinely apply legal instruments to novel situations over time, their meaning
remains fixed.").
173. See supra text accompanying note 150. Justice Scalia has a similar prescription for other
constitutional rights. See supra text accompanying notes 153-155 and 158-159.
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a. Whether the Weapon Is a "LinealDescendant" ofa Framing-Era
Weapon
The first subpart of this inquiry delves into what bearable arms
qualify for Second Amendment protection and requires a careful
determination of whether a modem-day weapon is a "lineal descendant"
of a weapon that existed in the Framing era. Here, the term "lineal
descendant" is being used not in its ordinary sense but in a somewhat
novel manner. Ordinarily, the term is used in the context of ancestry
and inheritance: "A blood relative in the direct line of descent," such
that "[c]hildren, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren are lineal
descendants."l 74 The first court to apply the term "lineal descendant" to
weapons in the Second Amendment context appears to have been the
75
which the Supreme
D.C. Circuit in Parker v. District of Columbia,1
Court later partly affirmed (under a different case name) in Heller.
In Parker,the D.C. Circuit held that "[t]he modem handgun-and for
that matter the rifle and long-barreled shotgun-is undoubtedly quite
improved over its colonial-era predecessor, but it is, after all, a lineal
descendant of that founding-era weapon, and it passes Miller's
standards."' At oral argument in Heller, Chief Justice John Roberts
picked up on this use of the term "lineal descendant," referring to "lineal
Every lawyer who argued Heller
descendents of the arms.. ...
before the Supreme Court also referred to the term, albeit without much
elaboration. 17 And judges have since alluded to the general concept of
a "lineal descendant" of a Framing-era weapon, as did Judge Brett
Kavanaugh when he endorsed an originalist approach to the Second
Amendment:
[W]hen legislatures seek to address new weapons that have not
traditionally existed ... [t]hat does not mean the Second
Amendment does not apply to those weapons .... Nor does it
174. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 476 (8th ed. 2004); cf id (defining "collateral descendants" as
"a blood relative who is not strictly a descendant, such as a niece or nephew").
175. 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), af'd sub nom. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008).
176. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
177. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 77, Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2008),
availableat http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/07-290.pdf. The Chief
also wondered out loud whether "there are lineal descendents of [gun] restrictions as well." Id. As far
as specific 18th-century analogues go, this may not be the case. See supra notes 114-115 and
accompanying text.
178. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 22, Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2008),
7 29
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/0 - 0.pdf (Mr.
Dellinger commenting on protection for "lineal descendants"); id. at 47 (General Clement discussing
whether "lineal descedants" might, as a threshold, include machineguns); id at 61 (Mr. Gura suggesting
that machineguns may not be "'lineal descendent[s]').
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mean that the government is powerless to address those new
weapons . . . . Rather, in such cases the proper interpretive
approach is to reason by analogy....

All of these jurists (and some of these lawyers) seemed to be suggesting
that the relevant inquiry here is whether a newer weapon was derived,
somewhat proximately, from an older one. That is, the question of
"lineal descendancy" is whether a more modern weapon can be fairly
traced back to a Framing-era counterpart. For example, as the D.C.
Circuit said in Parker, handguns and rifles are the modem-day
equivalents of the colonial pistol and musket-that is, their "lineal
descendants." Though the question of "lineal descendancy" is not
entirely cut-and-dried but requires the exercise of judgment (and
perhaps some fact-finding),o8 0 it lends itself to practical application no
less so than questions of whether "governmental entanglement" with
religion becomes so "excessive" as to violate the First Amendment,' 8' or
whether a search is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.' 82
Justice Scalia should agree, as the question of "lineal descendancy"
comports with his originalist perspective. Just as he recognizes that the
Eighth Amendment applies to "all sorts of tortures quite unknown at the
time the Eighth Amendment was adopted,"' 83 so too must he
acknowledge that the Second Amendment applies to all sorts of
weapons unknown when the Second Amendment was adopted.184
179. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). In McCulloch
v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall endorsed a similar brand of deductive reasoning for
constitutional interpretation, explaining that a constitution, unlike a statute, requires that "only its great
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). Justice Scalia has relied on this passage from Chief Justice Marshall to
explain that with constitutional interpretation, unlike statutory interpretation, the "usual principles [of
interpretation] are being applied to an unusual text." Scalia, supra note 4, at 37.
180. Admittedly, the less cut-and-dried the question of "lineal descendancy" is, the greater the
risk that this new inquiry is itself indeterminate. For example, to be a "lineal descendant" of a Framingera weapon, must a firearm be muzzle-loading? Must it not use cartridges? Must it have no optics for
sighting? Must it have no magazine and no attachment points for lights or optics? If magazines are
included, are belt-fed weapons included? If expanding bullets are protected, are exploding munitions or
M203 grenade launchers also protected? Textualism, including originalism, does not pretend to have all
the answers. As Justice Scalia and other textualists readily admit, "[t]extualism will not relieve judges
of all doubts and misgivings about their interpretations. Judging is inherently difficult. . . ." SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 1, at xxix.
181. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (discussing the test for "excessive
government entanglement with religion" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
182. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (discussing the standard for "Fourth
Amendment reasonableness").
183. Scalia, supra note 150, at 145.
184. Relatedly, if a weapon bears less resemblance to a Framing-era equivalent but is nonetheless
held to qualify for Second Amendment protection, it may for this reason be reviewed under a lower
standard of constitutional scrutiny, such as intermediate scrutiny, depending on the circumstances.
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85
Indeed, he did so in Heller.1

b. Whether the Framing-EraEquivalent Was in Common Use When the
Second or FourteenthAmendment Was Adopted
If a weapon at issue is the "lineal descendant" of a Framing-era
weapon, the analysis moves to the next subpart of the inquiry into what
bearable arms are protected under the Second Amendment: a careful
determination of whether that Framing-era weapon was in common use
for lawful civilian purposes in 1791 or 1868. Courts can determine what
was in "common use" through fact-finding, by which they can receive
and consider evidence on how a weapon was used by law-abiding
citizens during Revolutionary or Reconstruction times. Then the inquiry
becomes a line-drawing exercise: How common is common enough?
Or, put another way, what is "common"? This last question is a
categorical one, similar to the question courts routinely ask to decide
what constitutes "religion"' 86 or "speech" 87 under the First Amendment,
or "search"' 88 or "seizure"l 89 under the Fourth Amendment. For
example, as Justice Scalia observed in Heller, the colonial pistol was
typically used by law-abiding citizens for lawful self-defense.1 90 Thus,
the colonial pistol and its "lineal descendants" (certain handguns) are
protected bearable arms within the meaning of the Second Amendment.
3. Whether Regulation of the Weapon Passes Constitutional Scrutiny
If a weapon is both bearable and a "lineal descendant" of a Framing185. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) ("[T~he Second Amendment extends,
prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the
time of the founding.").
186. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (interpreting "religion" in the
First Amendment context as "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by . .. God").
187. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (holding that "the creation
and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment").
188. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 n.3 (2012) (holding that "a 'search'
within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment" occurs "[w]here ... the Government obtains
information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area").
189. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (holding that "a vehicle
stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment").
190. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. Notably, the colonial pistol was also a standard-issue militia
weapon that would have served the militia-participation purpose announced in the Second Amendment's
prefatory clause. Second Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271, 273 § 4 (providing that artillery and
cavalry members shall furnish themselves with, among other things, "a pair of pistols"). The
Continental Congress likewise reported pistols as acceptable militia weapons, 25 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 741-42 (1922), as did the various states, see, e.g., ACTS AND LAWS OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT 150 (1784); STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 592 (1791).
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era weapon in common use for lawful civilian purposes in 1791 or 1868,
the third and final step in the proposed Second Amendment analysis is
to ask whether a challenged regulation passes the proper level of
constitutional scrutiny. In Heller, Justice Scalia declined to establish a
test for the constitutionality of gun laws; instead, he held that the
handgun ban and related trigger-lock requirement at issue in Heller were
so "severe" that they would violate the Second Amendment "[u]nder
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights....".

Other than clarifying that

Second

Amendment claims could not be subject to mere rational-basis
scrutiny,' 92 he left it to the lower courts to develop the proper
approach.193
Justice Scalia did, however, point to the First Amendment (and, to a
lesser extent, the Fourth Amendment) as instructive.194 And the lower
courts have generally applied either strict or intermediate scrutiny under
the Second Amendment, "depend[ing] on the nature of the conduct
being refulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the
right."' 9 As the Federal Courts of Appeals have begun to observe, "a
'severe burden on the core Second Amendment right of armed selfdefense should require a strong justification,' but 'less severe burdens
on the right' and 'laws that do not implicate the central self-defense
96
concern of the Second Amendment may be more easily justified."'l

191. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 629 n.27 (noting "separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws").
193. See id at 635 ("[S]ince this case represents this Court's first in-depth examination of the
Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field. . . .").
194. Id. at 579, 582, 591, 595, 635. Courts and commentators agree that the First Amendment, in
particular, is a useful guidepost in developing Second Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., United
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ("Categorical limits on the possession of
firearms would not be a constitutional anomaly. Think of the First Amendment, which has long had
categorical limits: obscenity, defamation, incitement to crime, and others."); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (reading Heller to imply that "the structure of First
Amendment doctrine should inform our analysis of the Second Amendment"); Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Essay, Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary Observations, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 247, 248,
251 (2012); cf Mark Tushnet, Essay, Heller and the Perils ofCompromise, 13 LEwIs & CLARK L. REV.
419, 419 (2009) (explaining that "the analogies [Heller] draws between the First and Second
Amendments" may cabin Second Amendment jurisprudence).
195. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010); see also, e.g., Nat'l Rifle Ass'n
of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir.
2012) (collecting cases from Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits). But see Skoien,
614 F.3d at 641-42 (en banc panel of the Seventh Circuit resisting "'levels of scrutiny' quagmire" but
nonetheless applying, in essence, intermediate scrutiny to a federal law prohibiting possession of
firearms by those convicted of a domestic-violence misdemeanor).
196. Nat'1 Rifle Ass'n ofAm., 700 F.3d at 195 (Fifth Circuit quoting the Fourth Circuit in Chester,
628 F.3d at 682) (brackets omitted). In Chester, the Fourth Circuit quoted the Seventh Circuit for this
same proposition. Chester, 628 F.3d at 682 (quoting United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 813-14
(7th Cir. 2009), vacated on othergrounds by rehearingen banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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This analytical framework fits well within the three-step approach to
Second Amendment challenges proposed here.
Although an exhaustive review of how the above three-step approach
would apply to various modem-day weapons is beyond the scope of this
Article, suffice it to say that many of the most dangerous, military-grade
weapons could be regulated or banned under this approach. Some of
those weapons would clearly fall outside the scope of the Second
Amendment because they are not bearable, such as missiles, bombers,
and tanks. Most (if not all) of the others either would not qualify as
"lineal descendants" of Framing-era weapons, or would be so dangerous
that robust regulations And outright bans may well pass even the most
exacting standards of constitutional scrutiny. For example, bazookas
and mortars (perhaps even machineguns) may trace their descent from
cannons, which almost certainly were not in common use for lawful
civilian purposes during the Framing era, neither in 1791 nor 1868 (nor
even today).197 Furthermore, regulations and bans on bazookas, mortars,
grenades, pipe guns, and machineguns' 98 may well pass constitutional
muster, given how dangerous they are and how attenuated (or
gratuitous) their use may be for the core Second Amendment purpose of
self-defense.199
In sum, the three-step approach endorsed here is not only workable
but also more originalist (and thus more textualist) than Justice Scalia's
present-time inquiry. The lower courts can and should move Second

197. This inquiry into what weapons were in common civilian use comports with what Justice
Scalia, relying on Blackstone, described in Heller as a historical prohibition on "the carrying of
'dangerous and unusual weapons."' Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE *148-49 and
citing other sources); see 4 BLACKSTONE *148-49 ("The offence of riding or going armed, with
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the
land."). Though Blackstone did not specify which weapons were considered "dangerous and unusual"
in the 18th century, courts could make a related determination-i.e., whether a particular weapon, such
as a cannon, was in common civilian use at that time-through fact-finding.
198. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 600 (1994) ("The National Firearms Act criminalizes
possession of an unregistered 'firearm,' 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), including a 'machinegun,' § 5845(a)(6),
which is defined as a weapon that automatically fires more than one shot with a single pull of the
trigger, § 5845(b)."); see generally National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2006)).
199. In Heller, Justice Scalia hinted that federal statutes regulating machineguns are
constitutional. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 624 (stating it would be "startling" to read the Second
Amendment in a way that would render unconstitutional federal statutory restrictions on machineguns).
Several courts have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 640
& n.3 (9th Cir. 2012) ("We agree with the reasoning of our sister circuits that machine guns are
'dangerous and unusual weapons' that are not protected by the Second Amendment." (collecting cases));
cf United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1326 (1lth Cir. 2009) (holding concealed weapons could be
prohibited because of their tendency to be used in violent crimes on unsuspecting victims); United
States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 404 (7th Cir. 2008) (likening sawed-off shotguns, for which federal
statutory restrictions were affirmed in Miller, to "other dangerous weapons like bazookas, mortars, pipe
bombs, and machine guns").
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Amendment jurisprudence toward this three-step approach, at least with
respect to the first step (i.e., bearable weapons) and the third step (i.e.,
level of constitutional scrutiny). 200 Heller not only permits but also
invites them to do so. In Heller, Justice Scalia said that the Second
Amendment extends, on its face, to all "bearable" weapons. 201 He
declined to establish a test for the constitutionality of gun laws, leaving
the lower courts free to apply a proper level of constitutional scrutiny
based on the specific conduct and gun law in question.202 In other
words, adopting the three-step approach outlined above would not
require a radical departure from Heller, only a modest refinement to its
flawed, not-quite-originalist discussion. Ultimately, however, the
Supreme Court may well have to clarify the correct approach and
provide the proper guidance.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Districtof Columbia v. Heller, Justice Scalia adopted a persuasive

textualist reading of the Second Amendment-as securing an individual,
nonabsolute right to keep and bear arms. But he misapplied the
textualist principle of originalism when he held that the right protects
only those weapons in common use at some ever-changing "present"

time. Instead, the right should extend to weapons that are "lineal
descendants" of weapons in common use at the time the Second or
FourteenthAmendment was adopted. This approach is more originalist.

It would better ensure that the right to keep and bear arms cannot be so
easily diminished over time based on the behavior of current and future
generations. And it would permit reasonable gun regulations and, in
some cases, even outright bans on certain classes of weapons.20 3 Thus,
by this approach, we can both respect our constitutional commitments
200. Lower courts have begun to develop a test for the constitutionality of gun laws. See supra
notes 195-196 and accompanying text. But no court, apparently, has held that a weapon is unprotected
on the ground it was not "bearable," perhaps because no litigant has been so bold as to assert a
constitutional right to have missiles, bombers, tanks, and the like.
201. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582.
202. See id. at 628-29.
203. See supra notes 194-199 and accompanying text. This should allay, at least somewhat, the
"fear that altogether plausible, perhaps even 'winning,' interpretations of the Second Amendment would
present real hurdles to those of us supporting prohibitory regulation." Sanford Levinson, The
EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989); see also ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT:
THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 295-96 (2011) ("As the history of the right

to bear arms and gun control shows, there is a middle ground in which gun rights and laws providing for
public safety from gun violence can coexist."); cf CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS

(1764) (decrying the "false utility" of laws that disarm only those neither inclined nor determined to
commit crimes). Indeed, one may read Heller to suggest that most gun laws may well be upheld. See
Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 ("Few laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction
of the District's handgun ban.").
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and work within them to help solve the vexing problem of gun violence
in America. Anything less would offend the rule of law and, in so
doing, betray our longtime goal to have a "government of laws, not of
men"-a worthy goal at the very heart of Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence.20 4

204. See Scalia, supra note 4, at 25 ("The rule of law is about form.... Long live formalism. It
is what makes a government a government of laws and not of men.").
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